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COMMENTS
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PRocEss AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
-SELF-INCRIMINATION-In the course of evolving workable doctrines
which gi:ve substance and meaning to the skeletal phrase "due process
of law" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment to limit state action,
the Supreme Court ·has frequently b'een called on to determine the
scope of the several prohibitions and guarantees of the Bill of Rights
of the federal Constitution. This general problem, and more particularly the application of the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause
to state criminal proceedings,. was again ·presented in a recent case 1
and resulted in a sharp division of opinion within the Court.
Petitioner, convicted of :first degree murder in California,2 challenged the validity of the provision of the California Constitution
which permits the court and counsel to comment on the failure of the
accused to testify in his own defense.3 Since petitioner had a criminal
record which could be revealed to the jury only if he took the stand/
Adamson v. California, (U.S. 1947) 67 S. Ct. 1672.
The California Supreme Court affirmed the conviction in People v. Admiral
Dewey Adamson, 27 Cal. (2d) 478, 165 P. (2d) 3 (1946).
8 Cal. Const., (1879) Art. 1, § 13 as amended Nov. 6, 1934; Cal. Penal Code
(Deering, _1941) § 1323.
4 Cal. Penal Code (Deering, 1941) §§ 1025, 1093 (1941) and Cal. Code of
Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1946) § 2051.
1

2
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he was faced with the choice of testifying in his own behalf and thus
exposing his prior record or of remaining silent and so affording an
opportunity for possible adverse comment. Confronted with this dilemma, petitioner chose the latter course, and the prosecutor commented
extensively on his silence .. Such comment, argued petitioner, violated
the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment; 5 and that privilege, he contended, is both an incident of national
citizenship and inherent in the right to a fair hearing protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6
In sustaining the conviction the Court divided five to four, with Justice
Reed speaking for the majority. Assuming arguendo that comment on
failure of the accused to testify would violate the Fifth Amendment,
Justice Reed could find no merit in the petitioner's contentions. The
Twining case,7 he noted, had held that freedom from self-incrimination in state trials is a matter of state citizenship, and it had long been
settled that in regard to citizenship rights the Fourteenth Amendment
did no more than recognize the duality of state-national citizenship
without extending national protection to the privileges and immunities
of state citizenship.8 As for the due process argument, the Court might
likewise have rested its decision that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
encompass the self-incrimination clause solely on the forty-year old
authority of the Twining case. The majority went further, however,
than merely to re-affirm the Twining ruling. Due process, Justice Reed
admitted, demands that a state grant a fair trial to an accused person,
but the fair trial requirement would not necessarily prevent a state
from compelling the accused to testify; in any event, it "does not seem
unfair to require him to choose between leaving the adverse evidence
unexplained and subjecting himself to impeachment through disclosure
of former crimes." 9
Justice Black, supported by Justices Murphy, Rutledge, and Douglas, took the view that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment made all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights binding on the
states.10 This he believed· was the intention of the framers of the
amendment as indicated by the historical evidence. In addition, he
11
"No person .•• shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself••••"
6
" • • • Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law••••"
7
Twining v. New Jersey, 2II U.S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14 (1908).
8 Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1872); for a discussion of the
background and implications of the decision see 2 WARREN, THE SUPREME CouRT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 533 et seq. (1937).
9
Adamson v. California, (U.S. 1947) 67 S. Ct. 1672 at 1678.
10
Id. at 1684 et seq.
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argued that the Bill of Rights, rather than the majority's "natural
law" theory, should be the criterion in determining whether the due
process concept embraces a particular right. Justices Murphy and Rutledge, while agreeing that the Fourteenth Amendment extended the
Bill of Rights to the states, did not conceive due process to be as limited
as Justice Black suggested; they thought there might be times when
the concept should be given a broader scope than indicated by the
specific guarantees of the first eight amendments.11
The possible implications of the position taken by Justice Black,
the wide divergence of the majority and minority views, and the closeness of the decision indicate that the case is of more than ordinary
interest and importance. In the light of this case, two related problems
merit discussion here: first, the court's treatment of due process in
terms-of the Bill of Rights, and secondly, the question of self-incrimination, particularly the validity of comment by court and counsel upon
failure of a defendant to testify in his own behalf.

I
That the framers of the Bill of Rights intended to restrict only the
federal government, not the states, is scarcely open to question.12 Undoubtedly, however, there is some basis in historical fact for the contention that- the proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment expected to
extend the first eight amendments to the states. It seems clear, for
example, that Congressman Bingham, who fathered the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause, was largely motivated by a desire
to nationalize the Bill of Rights.13 Yet it is equally clear that the
Congressional framers were strongly influenced by other motives which
were probably of more immediate moment-punishment of the South,
strengthening of the national government, and preservation of Radical
Republican control of Congress-and that these were the persuasive
factors in ratification.14 Further, it is doubtful that Congress and the
country intended that the due process clause should absorb all of the
first eight amendments in any literal sense. Justice Black's historical
support seems inconclusive at best.
Although the Court has persistently refused to incorporate the
entire Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, it has frequently
11

Id. at 1683.
Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. (32 U.S.) 242 (1833).
13
3 CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 2542 (1866); FLACK, THE ADOPTION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908).
14 FLACK, ibid.; CoLLINs, THE FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES
(1912); GUTHRIE, FOURTEENTH ARTICLE OF AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES (1898). The work by Flack provides a careful survey of
newspaper reports as well as Congressional debates.
12
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acknowledged that at least some of the rights specified in the first eight
amendments are essential to due process. The recognition of a relationship between due process and specific constitutional guarantees has been
especially evident in the Court's treatment of the so-called substantive
rights of the First Amendment. Thus in the past twenty-two years
the due process clause has progressively assimilated freedom of speech,
press, religion, and assembly,15 so that today the First Amendment is
regarded as limiting the states in substantially the same measure that ,
it limits the federal government.
In contrast to the recent but virtually complete assimilation of the
First Amendment, the procedural connotations of due process appear
at first glance to have developed with constraint and inconsistency.
Whether or not justified in theory, the Court in fact has rejected some
procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights as unnecessary to due
process, while accepting others as essential. The following instances
are illustrative. In I 8 84 the Hurtado case 16 held that due process did
not require California to adhere to grand jury indictment (Fifth
Amendment), Justice Matthews suggesting that due process should
include " . . . any legal proceeding enforced by public authority,
whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public
good.... " 17 This unwillingness to restrict state criminal procedures
to the confines of the Bill of Rights was reaffirmed in 1900; in sustaining the validity of the Utah eight-man jury in place of the common
law jury (Sixth Amendment), the Court remarked that the people of
each state "should have the right to decide for themselves what shall
be the form and character of the procedure in such trials." 18 Similarly,
the Court in later cases was unable to find that the state must observe
the prohibitions against self-incrimination 19 and double jeopardy 20
(Fifth Amendment). On the other hand, it has been axiomatic that
15
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625 (1925) (~peech); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625 (1931) (press); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900 (1940); Everson v. Board. of Education, (U.S. 1947)
67 S. Ct. 504 (religion); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255 (1937)
(assembly) •
16
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S. Ct. III (1884).
17
ld. at 537. It was recently reported that Judge Guy A. Miller of the Circuit
Court of Wayne County, Michigan, had vacated a 1932 murder conviction which
had been based on a prosecutor's information, because he interpreted the Adamson
decision as requiring the states to follow the method of indictment by grand jury
specified in the Fifth Amendment, DETROIT FREE PRESS, 1:8 (Oct. 2, 1947),
13 :1 (Oct. 4, 1947). The majority opinion in the Adamson case, however, offers
no suggestion that the Hurtado decision has been overruled.
18
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 at 605, 20 S. Ct. 448, 494 (1900).
19
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14 (1908).
20
Palko v. Connecticut, 30_2 U.S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149 (1937).
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the state must a:fford the accused a fair hearing, which demands more
than a mere pretense of trial.21 The requirement of a fair hearing,
the Court has said, forbids the state to deprive the accused of the assistance of counsel 22 (Sixth Amendment). In addition, it is hardly likely
that the Court would permit a state to indulge in cruel and unusual
punishment 23 (Eighth Amendment).
It is apparent that the procedural protections which due process
demands of the states cannot be determined merely by reference to the
federal Bill of Rights. What rationale, then, has prompted the Court
, to include some rights and exclude others? On what theory can it be
said that benefit of counsel is basic to due process while jury trial is
not? The classic answer was given by Justice Cardozo in Palko v.
Connecticut.24 Certain rights, he maintained, are fundamental; these
include the freedoms of-the First Amendment and the right to a fair
h~ring, including assistance of counsel; without them there could be
neither justice nor liberty; therefore they have been recognized as
limitations upon the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. But
other rights, such as jury trial and grand jury indictment, are on a
lower plane; they "may have value and importance ... even so, they
are not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." 25
It is this interpretation of due process in terms of fundamental
rights which Justice Black apparently considers the "natural law"
theory and which he vehemently criticizes as a guide to judicial decision. The natural law formula, he contends, "should be abandoned as
an incongruous excrescence on out Constitution." 20 His criticism seems
neither novel 27 nor persuasive. The fundamental rights doctrine does ·
not appear ~ynonymous with natural law as the latter term is commonly
understood,28 and surely does not leave the members of the Court free
to "roam at will in the limitless area of their own beliefs...." 29 It
may be conceded that an approach to due process which requires that
the Court periodically, decide what is "of the very essence of ordered
liberty" leaves wide room for the judges' personal predilections and
21

Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S. Ct. 265 (1923).
Powell v. Al:!bama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932); De Meerleer v.
Michigan, (U.S. 1947) 67 S. Ct. 596.
23
This was assumed, but not decided, in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
(U.S. 1947) 67 S. Ct. 374.
24
302 U.S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149 (1937).
25
Id. at 325.
'
26
Adamson v. California, (U.S. 1947) 67 S. Ct. 1672 at 1688.
27 HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930).
28
lbid.
29
Adamson v. California, (U.S. 1947) 67 S. Ct. 1672 at 1696 [dissenting
opinion of Justice Black, quoting from Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 at 600, note 4, 62 S. Ct. 736 (1942)].
22

/
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individual concepts of justice; but the alternative of mechanical reliance
on the limited guarantees of the Bill of Rights seems hardly more
inviting.80 In short; the Court's traditional method of developing the
due process concept by gradual inclusion and exclusion 81 would appear
to gain more in flexibility than it loses in uncertainty. Furthermore,
it is unlikely that even a jurist of the positivist school could avoid
altogether the difficulties of the natural law approach by using the
Bill of Rights as a due process yardstick. The positivist as well as the
philosopher is influenced to some extent by natural law ideas; 82 and
it would seem impossible to exclude this influence when deciding the
practical application of the brief and possibly ambiguous phrases of
the first eight amendments. Whatever the approach to interpretation
of due process, whether in terms of assimilation or of fundamental
rights, the element of judicial choice and assessment of values cannot
be avoided.
Finally, the practical objections to treating due process as the
equivalent of the Bill of Rights are formidable. As pointed out by
Justice Frankfurter,88 one effect would be to invalidate a sizeable segment of state law and to nullify proceedings completed under them.
More than half of the states have allowed accusation of crime by information instead of grand jury indictment; should due process now
be construed to mean that the states are bound by the grand jury
procedure of the Fifth Amendment, untold numbers of convicts would
have a valid claim to release or re-trial. Similarly, the requirement
of jury trial in any action for more than twenty dollars (Seventh
Amendment) would presumably necessitate re-litigation of claims in
the many states which authorize trial without a jury in suits involving
larger amo_unts. Unless we revert to a doctrinaire and mechanical
jurisprudence, it is difficult to accept the view that such practical considerations are of no moment.

II
The privilege against self-incrimination had its· origins in popular
80

This is apparently the opinion of one well-known advocate of civil liberties;
see Fraenkel, "The Supreme Court and Civil Rights: 1946 Term," 47 CoL. L. REv.
953 at 967 (1947).
81
Moody, J., in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 at 100, 29 S. Ct. 14
(1908).
,
82
"The Analytical School, though formally repudiating natural law, has been
influenced at all times by an anonymous natural law in the form of ethical views as
to what is fair and just. Positivists do not in fact deny that moral ideas influence the
law; they merely contend that ethical rules of conduct are not law until they receive
the approval of the lawmaking or law-enforcing agents of the sovereign." HAINES,
THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CoNCEPTS 322 (1930). ·
88
Adamson v. California, (U.S. 1947) 67 S. Ct. 1672 at 1683.
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reaction to the abuses of the inquistorial oath and the Star Chamber.34
Although apparently an accepted principle of common law in both
England and the American Colonies before 1700; the privilege could
not be found in any major constitutional document 35 until the Virginia
Bill of Rights of 1776. Such conspicuous absence from the Petition
of Right and the English Bill of Rights has led some historians to
suggest that the privilege w~s not generally considered of constitutional
importance prior to the adoption of the federal Constitution.86 Yet the
colonists seem to have thought otherwise, for the privilege was expressly named in the constitutions or bills of rights of seven states 87
some years before the Philadelphia Convention of 1787.
Today the constitutions of forty-six states contain prohibitions
against self-incrimination; 38 and in the other two states the privilege
has been recognized by judicial decision. 39 In view of this universal
acceptance, the debate as to whether due process of law extends the
privilege clause of the Fifth Amendment to the states may seem somewhat academic. The federal and state constitutional provisions, however, are invariably brief, offering little aid to the courts in deciding
what is meant by privilege against self-incrimination. Evidently it was
the intention of the framers of the Constitution to restrict the constitutional right to testimonial compulsion, as distinguished from search
and seizure or other procedures whi.ch might incriminate.40 Even so,
there may be problems of interpretatiqn. One such problem is involved
here-whether court and counsel may comment on the failure of the
accused to testify in his own behalf.
.
,
During nearly a century after establishment of the privilege as a
constitutional right, the question -of comment on the silence of the
defendant did not arise, since nowhere was the accused a competent
witness in his own defense until after the Civil War.41 Even after the
84

8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2250 (1940); Pittman, "The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America," 21 VA.
L. REV. 763 (1935).
85
The one exception was the Scotch Claim of Rights of 1689.
86
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2250 (1940); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78, 29 S. Ct. 14 ( I 908); but compare Pittman, "The Colonial and Constitutional
History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in ~erica," 21 VA. L. REv. 763

(1935).
87
Virginia (1776); Pennsylvania (1776); Maryland (1776); North Carolina
(1776); Vermont (1777); Massachusetts (1780); New Hampshire (1784).
88
See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2252 (1940) for a list of the various provisions.
89
State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902); State v. Zdanowicz,
69 N.J.L. 619, 55 A. 743 (1903).
40
8 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2250 (1940); Pittman, "The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America," 21 VA.
L. REV. 763 (1935).
41 The .first state to permit the accused to testify was Maine in 1864; see Reeder,
"Comment Upon Failure of Accused to Testify," 3 I M1cH. L. REv. 40 ( I 93 2).
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accused was given the right to testify, he might still choose to remain
silent. This raised the issue whether any inference might properly be
drawn from his self-imposed silence. It was apparent that failure to
take the stand should not raise a presumption of guilt; but it was also
unrealistic to suppose that the jury would completely ignore the possible inference of guilt stemming from the defendant's conduct. Most
jurisdictions recognized that it would be undesirable to instruct the
jury to disregard such an inference, since "to attempt to enlist the
layman in the process of nullifying his own reasoning powers is merely
futile, and tends towards confusion and a disrespect for the law's
reasonableness." 42 The question remained whether, in view of the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the court and counsel
might properly comment on the defendant's decision not to take the
stand.
The state courts have disagreed as to the propriety of such comment. The New Jersey court in Parker v. State expressed the view
that comment is legitimate:
"But when the accused is upon trial, and the evidence tends
to establish facts which if true would be conclusive of his guilt
of the charge against him, and he can disprove them by his own
oath as a witness, if the facts be not true, then his silence would
justify a strong inference that he could not deny the charges.
"Such an inference is natural and irresistible. It will be drawn
by honest jurymen, and no instructions will prevent it. Must a
court refrain from noticing that which is so plain and forcible an
indication of guilt? ... The rights of the accused are not invaded
or denied by proper comment on his silence." 43
Whatever the merits of the New Jersey opinion, it was not the ·
position of the majority. The Tennessee court expressed the prevailing
sentiment when it said:
"No inference of guilt can be drawn from the failure of a
defendant to testify for himself. Were it otherwise, a defendant
on trial might be put in the awful situation of being required to
commit perjury to avoid the consequences of his failure to avail
himself of the privilege extended him by the statute. The statute
might thus become an ingenious machine to compel a conscientious
defendant to testify against himself." 44
42

8 WIGMORE, EvmENcE, § 2272 at p. 416 (1940).
61 N.J.L. 308 at 313, 314, 39 A. 651 (1898); although New Jersey does
not have a constitutional provision against self-incrimination, the quoted opinion is
fairly representative of the minority view of those jurisdictions which do have such
a provision; selected quotations from other courts may be found in Reeder, "Comment
Upon Failure of Accussed to Testify," 31 MxcH. L. REv. 40 (1932).
44
Staples v. State, 89 Tenn. 231 at 233, 14 S.W. 603 (1890).
43
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Most legislatures appear to have accepted this view, for in a large
majority of states comment on the silence of the accused is now prohibited by statute.46
There is some doubt that the present Supreme Court regards the
privilege against self-incrimination as a constitutional bar to comment.
In the federal courts comment by counsel has not been allowed, but
this resulted from construction of the federal statute 46 which forbids
any presumption of guilt from the defendant's. silence, rather than
from interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. The validity of comment in the state courts hi:s been passed upon directly only in the
Twining case and the Adamson case now under discussion. In both
instances the Court assumed, but did not decide, that comment would
violate the self-incrimination privilege. The T-wining decision, how~
ever, indicates that the Court made this assumption simply to dispose
of the larger issue of the possible application, of the Fifth Amendment
to the states. At the close of his long opinion, Justice Moody noted
that "We have assumed only for the purpose of discussion that what
was done in the case at bar was an infringement of the privilege against
self-incrimination. We do not intend, however, to lend any countenance
to the truth of that assumption." 47 And in the Adamson case the same
assumption was weakened by Justice Reed's remarks on the construction and e:ffect of the California provision which allowed comment to
be made. He pointed out that the scope of permissible comment was
very narrow. While permitting inferences to be drawn, the provision
did not seem unfair to the accused since it did not create any rebuttable
or irrebuttable presumption of guilt or even of the truth of any fact. 48
Even if the Fifth Amendment were applicable to the states, the Adamson opinion indicates that a majority of the present Court would not
consider comment in state trials to be barred by the federal selfincrimination clause, provided such comment is kept within narrow
and well-defined limits.
Aside from the Fifth Amendment, comment by court and counsel
does not seem of such fundamental importance that it can be regarded
.as depriving a defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial. The
policy arguments in favor of permitting comment are strong.49 The
45

8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2272 (1940).
28 U.S.C. (1940) § 632; Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 13 S.. Ct.
765 (1893); see also United States v. Fleenor, (C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 162 F. (2d) 935.
47
Twining v. New Jersey, 2II U.S. 78 at II4, 29 S. Ct. 14 (1908).
48
Adamson v. People of California, (U.S. 1947) 67 S. Ct. 1672 at 1677.
49
The arguments for and against allowing comment are well presented in Bruce,
"The Right to Comment on the Failure of the Defendant to Testify," 3 l MICH. L.
REV. 226 (1932), and Reeder, "Comment Upon Failure of Accused to Testify,"
3 l MICH. L. REv. 40 ( 193 2) ; see also the discussion of policy 'factors in 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE, § 2272 a (1940).
46
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innocent defendant will ordinarily wish to speak in his own behalf;
the objection that he may refrain because of timidity or nervousness
seems specious at best. If, therefore, the silence of the accused suggests
guilt, there would seem to be little injustice in allowing this inference
to be brought to the jury's attention. The chief objection to comment
is the rule of impeachment, for even the innocent accused may hesitate
to take the witness stand out of fear of disclosure of past crimes. In
the Adamson case the California Supreme Court admitted that fear
of disclosure "is a plausible explanation of his failure to take the stand
to deny or explain evidence against him." 110 The court agreed that
the impeachment rule weakened the inference which might be drawn
from the defendant's silence, but pointed out that the trial court could
not explain this weakness to the jury without prejudicing the defendant
by revealing the criminal record which the defendant wished to conceal. u
As long as the accused must face the risk of revealing an unsavory
record if he chooses to testify, it may justifiably be contended that
comment on his failure to take the witness stand is undesirable. The
solution, however, would seem to be to eliminate this risk by barring
disclosure of past crimes, rather than to prohibit comment altogether.
Provided the ,defendant is afforded this protection, there seems little
valid objection to comment. The Maine court stated in r87r:
"If innocent, he will regard the privilege of testifying as a
boon justly conceded. If guilty, it is optional with the accused to
testify or not, and he cannot complain of the election he may
make. If he does not avail himself of the privilege of contradiction or explanation, it is his fault, if by his own misconduct or
crime he has placed himself in such a situation that he prefers
any inferences which may be drawn from his refusal to testify,
to those which must be drawn from his testimony, if truly delivered." 112
F. William Hutchinson

Go People v. Admiral Dewey Adamson, 27 Cal. (2d) 478 at 494, 165 P. (2d)
3 (1946).
Gl Ibid.
112 State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298 at 301 (1871).

